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THE SEARCH FOR A DISTINCT RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY
JURISPRUDENCE UNDER THE WASHINGTON STATE
CONSTITUTION
Katie Hosford
Abstract: Article I, Section 11, of the Washington Constitution, titled "Religious
Freedom," provides more protection for free exercise of religion and the separation of church
and state than the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Because the state constitution
provides broader protection for each right, a natural tension arises between the two rights.
However, rather than relying on the text of the state constitution, the Supreme Court of
Washington has imposed an entirely federal analysis on free exercise cases brought under
Washington law. In addition, the establishment cases under Article I, Section 11, have
inconsistently interpreted the language of the state constitutional provision. This Comment
argues that the court should adopt a truly distinct analysis under Article I, Section 11, that
would rely on the constitutional text and focus on the common goal of individual religious
liberty present in both the free exercise and establishment protections. This Comment
concludes that a workable framework would involve a synthesis of free exercise and
establishment principles into the goal of individual religious freedom, thus alleviating the
tension between the two principles.
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Supreme Court of
Washington's decision in Witters v. State of Washington Commission for
the Blind' and held that providing financial aid to a blind student to study
for a religious vocation did not violate the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.2 The Court remanded the case, noting that "[o]n
remand, the state court is of course free to consider the applicability of
the 'far stricter' dictates of the Washington State Constitution."3 On
remand, the Supreme Court of Washington did just that and held that
despite the constitutionality of the financial aid under federal law, the
Washington Constitution's more specific religion provisions forbid the
use of state aid for religious instruction.4 The second Witters decision
demonstrated the court's willingness to rely on the Washington
Constitution where the requirements of that constitution are stronger than
those of the federal constitution, and marked the beginning of a period of
1. 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984), rev'd sub nom. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
2. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,482 (1986).
3. Id at 489 (quoting Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 626,
689 P.2d 53, 55 (1984)).
4. See Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 365, 771 P.2d 1119,
1120 (1989).
Washington Law Review
exploration by the court into the dictates of Article I, Section 11, of the
Washington State Constitution, entitled "Religious Freedom."5
Three years before Witters, the Supreme Court of Washington had
developed a six-factor analysis for approaching questions that fall under
both the state and federal constitutions, and the court seemed poised to
develop a distinct jurisprudence under Article I, Section 11.6 However,
since that time the Supreme Court of Washington has repeatedly
expressed its intent to rely on the state constitution in the area of
religious liberty7 and yet failed to produce a distinct jurisprudence under
Article I, Section 11, that accounts for the differences between the
federal and state constitutions.' The court has relied primarily on federal
precedent when interpreting the Washington Constitution's language
pertaining to free exercise of religion9 and has inconsistently interpreted
the language requiring the separation of church and state.' Although the
court has announced that the state constitution affords more protection
than the federal constitution for both free exercise and establishment
rights," it has failed to address the implications of these increased
protections on the relationship between the two rights. When taken to
their extremes, free exercise and separation of church and state have the
potential to lead to contradictory results: a government action that
accommodates free exercise may violate the separation of church and
state, or a government action that separates church and state may infringe
on free exercise rights. 2
Part I of this Comment introduces the backdrop of the federal
constitutional approach to religious liberty. 3 Part II traces the historical
development of Washington's Article I, Section 11, and the application
of the provision by Washington courts, focusing on developments during
the last decade. Part III argues that the Supreme Court of Washington
should develop a distinct jurisprudence under Article I, Section 11, that
relies on that provision's text and emphasizes the goal of individual
5. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
6. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (1986).
7. See Maylon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 792-97, 935 P.2d 1272, 1279-82 (1997);
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 223, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (1992).
8. See infra Part ll.C-D.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. See infra Part ll.D.
11. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 792-97, 935 P.2d at 1279-82; First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at
223-26, 840 P.2d at 186-87.
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. Religious liberty encompasses both free exercise and establishment rights.
Vol. 75:643, 2000
Religious-Liberty Jurisprudence in Washington
religious freedom to resolve the tension between free exercise and
establishment.
I. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."14 These two short clauses on
religion, the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses respectively, serve
as the basis for the relationship between church and state in the United
States. The First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment i" and provides the "floor" for religious liberty in the state
courts.'6 Accordingly, although states may not provide less protection for
religious liberty than the federal constitution, they may provide more
protection through their state constitutions. Many state constitutions
define the parameters of religious liberty more specifically than does the
First Amendment.1
7
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has spawned a complex
body of case law on religious freedom.'8 Because the First Amendment
describes the appropriate relationship between religion and the state in
just two short clauses, federal courts have developed detailed tests to
guide them in the two distinct areas of jurisprudence concerning religion:
establishment and free exercise of religion. 9
A. The First Amendment's Establishment Clause: The Three-Prong
Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test, and the Coercion Test
The Establishment Clause prohibits Congress from passing laws
"respecting" religious establishment.2' For guidance as to what
constitutes "respectl]," the Supreme Court employs a three-prong test
14. U.S. Const. amend. L
15. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (Establishment Clause); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause).
16. See G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 Wash. L. Rev. 73, 80 (1989).
17. See d. at76.
18. See lda at 74. ("mhe Supreme Court's jurisprudence under the religion clauses is widely
perceived to be in disarray.").
19. See infra notes 20-31 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. Const. amend. L
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originally formulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman.21 A government action
violates the Establishment Clause under Lemon if it (1) does not have a
secular purpose, (2) has the principal or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion, or (3) fosters "an excessive government entanglement
with religion.
22
In recent years the Court has modified the Lemon test to include
consideration of other principles. The first of these principles is known as
the endorsement principle. In County of Allegheny v. American Civil
Liberties Union,' the Court adopted the endorsement principle, holding
that a nativity display on the county courthouse steps would
unconstitutionally endorse religion, but that the display of a Jewish
menorah alongside a city Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty would
not constitute an unconstitutional endorsement of any particular
religion.24 More recently, the Court has analyzed the Establishment
Clause by relying on the principle known as coercion. In Lee v.
Wiseman,25 the Court held that a prayer at a public high school
graduation violated the Establishment Clause because it coerced the
students to support or participate in religion.26
B. The First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause: The "Strict
Scrutiny" Test of Sherbert and the Neutrality Exception of Smith
The Free Exercise Clause ensures that Congress cannot pass laws that
inhibit the free exercise of religion.27 In Sherbert v. Verner,8 the Court
for the first time protected religious conduct, adding to the existing
protection for religious belief,29 and held that a Seventh Day Adventist
could not be denied unemployment compensation because she refused to
take a job that required her to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. 0 The
"strict scrutiny" test, which the court borrowed from freedom-of-
21. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding public reimbursement of sectarian schools for materials and
instructors in secular courses unconstitutional).
22. Id. at 612-13.
23. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
24. See id. at 579, 592-94.
25. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
26. See id. at 587.
27. See U.S. Const. amend. I.
28. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29. See Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1606, 1705-08
(1987) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
30. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399-402.
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expression cases, invalidates any government action that burdens the free
exercise of religion unless such action serves a compelling state interest
and uses the means least restrictive of religion to achieve that interest.3 '
In 1990, the Supreme Court narrowed Sherbert's strict scrutiny test in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.32 In
Smith, the Court held that denying unemployment benefits to Native
Americans who violated state law by using peyote in their religion did
not infringe on the right of free exercise."3 The Court reasoned that where
a law is neutral and generally applicable, it may burden free exercise of
religion even if such law is not supported by a compelling state interest.'
Even though the law in Smith prohibiting drug use burdened the free
exercise of Native Americans' religion, the Court upheld the law because
it was neutral and applied generally to all citizens.35 In reaction to the
Court's narrowing of the strict scrutiny test of Sherbert, Congress passed
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993,36 which sought
to restore free exercise protections to their pre-Smith levels.37 However,
in City of Boerne v. Flores,31 the Supreme Court held that the RFRA
unconstitutionally exceeded Congress' enforcement powers under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.39 Because Congress' attempt to
override Smith failed, Smith remains good law and governs challenges
under the Free Exercise Clause.
C. The Tension Between the First Amendment's Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses
The Court's protection of religiously motivated conduct under the
Free Exercise Clause, such as the refusal to work on a Saturday in
Sherbert, reveals the tension between the two religion clauses of the First
Amendment.' The Free Exercise Clause requires that government refrain
31. See id at 406-09 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963)).
32. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
33. See id. at 890.
34. See id at 884-85.
35. See id at 885.
36. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-I to
2000bb-4 (1994)).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a) (1994).
38. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39. See id at 532.
40. See Developments in the Law, supra note 29, at 1717-18. In a concurring opinion in Sherbert,
Justice Stewart warned that the accommodation of religious conduct could not be reconciled with the
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from inhibiting the free exercise of religion, while the Establishment
Clause simultaneously requires that government refrain from "respect-
ing" religion. By enacting legislation designed to ensure free exercise,
the government risks supporting religion. For example, in Board of
Education of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,41 the
Supreme Court held that a state legislature could not create a special
school district for a village populated almost entirely by Orthodox Jews
of the Satmar Hasidic sect.42 Private religious schools, attended by most
of the children in the village, could not accommodate disabled students,
so these students were forced to attend the public schools where they
suffered "panic, fear, and trauma" from being outside of their own
community.43 By designating the special school district, the state
legislature sought to accommodate the free exercise of religion of the
citizens of Kiryas Joel.' However, the Court held that under the
Establishment Clause, the legislature could not single out one religion for
special treatment. 45 Although the Court invalidated this attempt to
accommodate religion, it noted that there is "ample room under the
Establishment Clause for benevolent neutrality which will permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference. 4
6
II. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY UNDER THE WASHINGTON
CONSTITUTION
Overlaid upon the federal religion clauses and their case law is the
Washington State Constitution's corresponding religion provision,
Article I, Section 11. Essential to a discussion of the Washington
provision is an understanding of the historical context in which it was
enacted and an examination of the case law interpreting religious liberty
in Washington.
Court's construction of the Establishment Clause. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-15
(1963) (Stewart, J., concurring).
41. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
42. See id. at 690.
43. Id. at 691-92.
44. See id. at 699.
45. See id. at 701-02.
46. Id. at 705 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987)).
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A. The Historical Development of the Washington State Constitution s
Religion Provisions
In 1889, the Washington legislature enacted the religion provisions of
the Washington State Constitution amidst a national debate over the
proper relationship between church and state in education.4 7 During the
early nineteenth century, Protestants, as the religious majority, started a
nationwide movement for common, or public, schools.48 In response,
Roman Catholics created more parochial schools and demanded support
from the government.4 9 Protestant supporters of common schools worried
that Roman Catholics would control the nation's educational system,
thereby instilling in children Catholic rather than Protestant views."0 To
prevent this, a Protestant movement began in 1875 to amend the federal
constitution to prohibit the states from supporting religion.5" The "Blaine
Amendment," proposed in 1875, would have prohibited the use of state
funds for the support of any religious sect, but would have allowed Bible
reading in the public schools.52 Although the amendment failed,53 the
movement to curb state sponsorship of religion continued. In 1889, U.S.
Senator William Blair proposed a constitutional amendment that would
have prohibited government support of sectarian schools and sectarian
teaching in public schools.' However, like the Blaine Amendment
before it, the proposal failed. 5
Despite the failure of these proposed federal constitutional
amendments, the substance of the proposals survived in the Federal
47. See generally Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The
History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 Hastings Const. L.Q.
451 (1988).
48. See U at 464.
49. See id.
50. See ikL at 464-67.
51. Seeid. at463.
52. See 4 Cong. Rec. 205 (1875). The text of the amendment in its final Senate form read:
No state shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof .... No public property, and no public revenue of, nor any loan or
credit... shall be appropriated to, or made to be used for, the support of any religious or
antireligious sect, organization, or denomination or to promote its interests or tenets. This article
shall not be construed to prohibit the reading of the Bible in any school or institution; and it
shall not have the effect to impair the rights of property already vested.
Id.
53. See 4 Cong. Rec. 5191, 5595 (1876).
54. See 20 Cong. Rec. 2100 (1889); S. 86, 50th Cong. (1888).
55. See Utter & Larson, supra note 47, at 461-62.
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Enabling Act, which served as the instrument for creating new states. 6
Washington joined the Union under the Federal Enabling Act, which
required the state constitution to provide for a strict separation between
public education and sectarian influence and control." Thus, the
Washington Constitution's religion provisions derive from essentially the
same intentions as those behind the Blaine and Blair proposed
amendments to the U.S. Constitution. As a result, the Washington State
Constitution addresses religion more explicitly than the federal
constitution. Three separate provisions address the state's role with
regard to religion. The broadest of these is Article I, Section 11, titled
"Religious Freedom," which states:
Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious
sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every
individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or
property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of
licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state. No public money or property shall be
appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That this article shall not be so
construed as to forbid the employment by the state of a chaplain for
such of the state custodial, correctional, and mental institutions, or
by a county's or public hospital district's hospital, health care
facility, or hospice as in the discretion of the legislature may seem
justified. No religious qualification shall be required for any public
office or employment, nor shall any person be incompetent as a
witness or juror, in consequence of his opinion on matters of
religion, nor be questioned in any court of justice touching his
religious belief to affect the weight of his testimony."
In addition to this section, the Washington Constitution directly
addresses the issue of religion and education in two other provisions.
56. See Frank J. Conklin & James M. Vache, The Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause of the Washington Constitution-A Proposal to the Supreme Court, 8 U. Puget Sound L.
Rev. 411,436 (1985).
57. See Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat. 676, 676-77 (1889). The Act required that the state
convention provide for "the establishment and maintenance of a system of public schools, which
shall be open to all children... and free from sectarian control." Enabling Act, ch. 180, § 4, 25 Stat.
at 676-77.
58. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
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Article IX, Section 4, provides: "All schools maintained or supported
wholly or in part by public funds shall be forever free from sectarian
control or influence."' 9 Article XXVI states in part: "Provision shall be
made for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools
free from sectarian control which shall be open to all the children of said
state."' 6° Article I, Section 11, of the Washington Constitution is similar
to the Blaine Amendment, 6 while Article IX, Section 4, and Article
XXVI serve the same purposes as the Blair proposal. 2
B. Determining Whether to Apply the State or Federal Constitution:
The Gunwall Criteria
In Washington, as in every state, both the federal and state
constitutions protect religious liberty. While the federal constitution
provides minimum standards for religious-freedom rights, states may
provide broader protection so long as it does not conflict with federal
constitutional guarantees.' In the 1980s, the Supreme Court of
Washington developed principles and criteria to guide it in defining the
relationship between the Washington and federal constitutions. In State
v. Coe," the court announced what has since been called a "dual
sovereignty" approach in cases involving both state and federal
constitutional questions.' Under this approach, the court first evaluates
the state constitutional provision and then conducts an analysis of the
federal constitutional protections.' However, the dual sovereignty
approach applies only where the state constitutional protections differ
from the federal constitutional protections. To aid in this analysis, in
State v. Gunwall,67 the Supreme Court of Washington laid out six criteria
59. Wash. Const. art X, § 4.
60. Wash. Const. art. XXVI. This Comment will not address the latter two provisions but will
discuss only Article , Section 11.
61. See Utter & Larson, supra note 47, at 468.
62. See id. at 458, 469.
63. See Tarr, supra note 16, at 80.
64. 101 Wash. 2d 364,679 P.2d 353 (1984).
65. See Justice Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitu-
tionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 Temple L. Rev. 1153, 1160 (1992).
66. See id. This approach has the advantage of providing guidance to courts in other states in the
federal analysis of questions not yet presented to the federal courts. See id. However, the Supreme
Court of Washington does not always provide a discussion of the federal constitution where the state
constitution is found to have been violated. See, e.g., Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 930 P.2d
318 (1997).
67. 106 Wash. 2d 54,720 P.2d 808 (1986).
Washington Law Review
for determining whether the state constitution provides different
protections than analogous provisions of the federal constitution and thus
demands an independent analysis: (1) textual language of the state
constitution, (2) significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions
of the federal and state constitutions, (3) state constitutional and
common-law history, (4) preexisting state law, (5) differences in
structure between the federal and state constitutions, and (6) matters of
particular state interest or local concern. 8
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that under Gunwall,
Article I, Section 11, provides more protection than the federal
constitution for both free exercise of religion69 and separation of church
and state.7" In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle,7 the Supreme
Court of Washington employed the Gunwall criteria in analyzing the free
exercise language in Article I, Section 11, and concluded that the
protections of Article I, Section 11, are sufficiently different from those
of the federal First Amendment to require independent analysis.72 In
applying the Gunwall criteria, the court found that the free exercise
language in the Washington Constitution is stronger than the language in
the First Amendment because Washington "absolutely" protects freedom
of worship rather than limiting government action.7" The court noted that
Article I, Section 11, protects individuals from being "disturbed" on the
basis of religion and protects all religious conduct so long as it is not
"licentious" or inconsistent with public "peace and safety."'74 The court
also looked to differences in structure between the federal and state
constitutions,7" as well as the state constitutional and common-law
history, to find that Article I, Section 11, provides broader protection for
religious freedom than does the First Amendment.76 Finally, the court
noted that a broader interpretation of the state constitution is warranted
because while the federal constitution grants limited power to the federal
68. See id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
69. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 223-26, 840 P.2d 174, 186-
87 (1992).
70. See Maylon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 792-97, 935 P.2d 1272, 1279-82 (1997).
71. 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174 (1992).
72. See id. at 226, 840 P.2d at 187.
73. See id. at 224, 840 P.2d at 186.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 225, 840 P.2d at 186.
76. See id. at 224-25, 840 P.2d at 186.
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government, the Washington Constitution is structured to limit the
plenary power of the state."
Turning to the Washington establishment provision, the Supreme
Court of Washington again applied the Gunwall criteria in Maylon v.
Pierce County,78 and concluded that this provision also affords more
protection than the First Amendment and should be independently
analyzed.79 Under the first two Gunwall criteria, which examine the state
constitution's text standing alone and as compared to the analogous
federal provisions, the Maylon court found that the language of Article I,
Section 11, is more specific than that of the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment and that the language differs greatly. 0 The state
constitution enumerates four specific purposes for which public money
may not be used: religious worship, religious exercise, religious
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment." By contrast,
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment simply prohibits laws
"respecting the establishment of religion." 2
The Maylon court then examined Washington's constitutional and
common-law history and found that while the drafters of the state
constitution sought a strict separation of religion and public education,
they intended the language to provide for a more flexible accommodation
of religion in other arenas. 3 For example, the court pointed out that the
constitution explicitly allows the state to pay the salaries of chaplains in
public programs." Although the Supreme Court of Washington has
concluded under Gunwall that the Washington Constitution's protection
of religious liberty differs from that of the federal First Amendment, the
court's analysis of Article I, Section 11, has not always reflected those
differences.
77. Seeid
78. 131 Wash. 2d 779,935 P.2d 1272 (1997).
79. See id at 791-98, 935 P.2d at 1277-81. Justice Utter in his Witters dissent criticized the
majority for failing to use the Gunwall criteria. See Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind,
112 Wash. 2d 363,381-90,771 P.2d 1119, 1128-33 (1989) (Utter, J., dissenting).
80. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 793, 935 P.2d at 1278.
81. See 1&
82. U.S. Coast. amend. I; see Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 793, 935 P.2d at 1278.
83. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 795, 935 P.2d at 1280.
84. See i& at 797, 935 P.2d at 1280.
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C. Free Exercise Under Article I, Section 11: Government May
Burden a Sincere Exercise of Religion Only When Necessary to
Serve a Compelling State Interest
Under the current Article I, Section 11, test for free exercise, the
complaining party has the initial burden of showing a coercive 5 effect of
the government action on religion. 6 If this burden is met, the government
must demonstrate that the action is the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling state interest.87  In arriving at this test,
Washington courts have addressed free exercise rights in a variety of
contexts.88 The historical evolution of free exercise case law under the
Washington Constitution illustrates a trend of relying on federal law. A
major step in the historical development of the current test came in State
ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong,9 where the Supreme Court of Washington
held that a student at the University of Washington could not refuse on
religious grounds to submit to an x-ray examination to screen for
tuberculosis.9' In that case, the court adopted a test allowing the state to
restrict citizens' religion-based actions "only to prevent grave and
immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."92
85. Coercive effect in this context means placing a burden on free exercise and should be
distinguished from the coercion principle in federal establishment-clause jurisprudence as in Lee v.
Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
86. See Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997) (quoting First United
Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam'r for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd., 129 Wash. 2d
238, 246, 916 P.2d 347, 379 (1996)).
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., id. at 209-10 (holding that state may not place administrative burden on demolition
of church building for reasons of historical preservation); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735, 741,
612 P.2d 795, 799 (1980) (holding that interest of state in blood testing putative fathers outweighed
fathers' religious objection to blood testing); Bolling v. Superior Court, 16 Wash. 2d 373, 387, 133
P.2d 803, 809-10 (1943) (holding that state may not compel students to salute American flag if it is
contrary to their religious beliefs); State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 64-66, 954 P.2d 931, 941-42
(1998) (holding that state interest in regulating drug use and possession outweighs interest in drug
use for religious purposes); State v. Clifford, 57 Wash. App. 127, 130-34, 787 P.2d 571, 573-75
(1990) (holding that state may require driver's license despite religious belief that this places state on
same level as God).
89. See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 226-27, 840 P.2d 174,
187 (1992); City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 8, 639 P.2d 1358, 1362 (1982);
State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d 545, 548 (1952).
90. 39 Wash. 2d 860, 239 P.2d 545 (1952).
91. See id. at 266, 239 P.2d at 549.
92. Id. at 864, 239 P.2d at 548 (citing West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
639 (1943)).
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This test derived from federal First Amendment case law.93 In City of
Sumner v. First Baptist Church,94 the court modified this test, asking first
whether the state interest involved outweighed the free exercise claim,
and second, if the state interest could have been satisfied in a way not
infringing on religious liberty.95 The Sumner case involved the use of a
church basement as a school in violation of a building code and zoning
ordinance.96 Since Sumner, the court has modified the test for free
exercise to ask whether a government action that burdens religion is the
least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.97
1. The Supreme Court of Washington Has Relied on Federal Analysis
in Its Interpretation of the Free Exercise Language ofArticle 1,
Section 11
Despite the Supreme Court of Washington's conclusion under the
Gunwall criteria that Article I, Section 11, provides more protection than
the First Amendment and should be analyzed separately,98 the court's
current test is virtually identical to the federal strict scrutiny test under
Sherbert.99 The Supreme Court of Washington's recent free exercise
discourse under Article I, Section 11, has centered around restrictions on
the use and development of church property."° The court has repeatedly
recognized the state constitutional right of churches to be exempt from
historic-preservation ordinances that restrict changes to buildings."°1
Applying a test that mirrors the federal strict scrutiny test for free
93. See id.
94. 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982).
95. See id, at 9, 639 P.2d at 1363.
96. See iat at 1, 639 P.2d at 1358.
97. See Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192,199, 930 P.2d 318,321 (1997).
98. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text
99. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 234, 840 P.2d 174, 191
(1992) (Utter, J., concurring). Although the court in First Covenant did not cite Sherbert, it cited
Witters, which relied on Sherbert in discussing free exercise. See ki at 226, 840 P.2d at 187 (citing
Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 371, 771 P.2d 1119, 1122-23
(1989)).
100. See generally Munns, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 930 P.2d 318; First United Methodist Church v.
Hearing Exam'r for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd., 129 Wash. 2d 238, 916 P.2d 374
(1996); First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 840 P.2d 174; Sumner, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358;
Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 1998 WL 341968 (Wash. Ct. App. June 26, 1998).
101. See Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 209-10, 930 P.2d at 326; First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d
at 251-52, 916 P.2d at 381; First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 840 P.2d at 189.
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exercise under Sherbert,"°2 the court has found that historic-landmark
preservation is not a compelling state interest.'0 3 Under the same test,
however, the court has recognized the state's interest in requiring
churches to submit to a permitting process for zoning purposes.
In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, the Supreme Court of
Washington held that enforcing a landmark-preservation ordinance that
restricted churches from making any changes to their buildings violated
the right of free exercise of religion secured by both the state and federal
constitutions. 4 The court analyzed the ordinance under Article I,
Section 11, by asking whether the ordinance was narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest-the question asked under federal strict
scrutiny.'15 While the test used in First Covenant resembles the Sumner
test, First Covenant explicitly adopted the terminology of the federal
strict scrutiny test where Sumner had not.106
Applying this test, the First Covenant court found that although the
ordinance did not totally restrict changes in places of worship, the First
Covenant Church was nevertheless burdened in freely exercising its
religion because it was required to obtain the approval of the Landmarks
Preservation Board before making any such changes. 7 The court found
that the city's interest in restricting the changes was not compelling
enough to justify the burden on religion0 8 and held that the ordinance as
applied to First Covenant violated the state constitution.1 9
In Munns v. Martin,"° the court provided an even more complete
formulation of the test for free exercise of religion under the Washington
Constitution. This test is based primarily on First Covenant's use of
federal analysis."' The first question asked under the Munns test is
whether the burdened party sincerely holds the religious belief."2 The
party must prove that the beliefs allegedly infringed upon are central to
102. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
103. See Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 209, 930 P.2d at 326; First United Methodist, 129 Wash. 2d at
247, 916 P.2d at 379; First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 227, 840 P.2d at 188.
104. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 229-30, 840 P.2d at 188-89.
105. See id.
106. See id.; City of Sumner v. First Baptist Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 639 P.2d 1358, 1363
(1982).
107. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 226-27, 840 P.2d at 187.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 228, 840 P.2d at 188.
110, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 930 P.2d 318 (1997).
111. See id. at 199, 935 P.2d at 321.
112. See id.
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his or her religious convictions, regardless of the reasonableness of those
beliefs."' Second, the aggrieved party must show an actual burden or
coercive effect on free exercise of religion as a result of the challenged
law or action." 4 Finally, the court asked whether the burden is justified
by a compelling state interest and whether the state employed the least
restrictive means possible to achieve its goal.' 5 The court noted that
under Article I, Section 11, the compelling state interests that have been
recognized are limited to those that protect public health, peace, and
welfare." 6 Because the Washington State Register of Historic Places
listed the church's school building,"7 the City of Walla Walla was
authorized by law to issue a waiting period for negotiation of up to
fourteen months before issuing a demolition permit."' The court held
that this administrative burden, delaying the issuing of a demolition
permit to the church, unlawfully infringed on the right of free exercise
under Article I, Section 11l."'
Most recently, in Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County,2 ° the
court held that the county could require the church to apply for a
conditional use permit and pay the attendant fees without violating
Article I, Section 11.121 Relying on the Munns test, the court found that
the permit process did not impose a burden on Open Door's free exercise
of religion.' Although the county could potentially deny the permit to
Open Door, the court held that this potential burden is not sufficient for
purposes of the test, noting that the church was allowed to continue its
activities until the resolution of the permit application." The court
113. See id at 199-200, 930 P.2d at 321.
114. See id at 200,930 P.2d at 321.
115. See id at 200-01,930 P.2d at321-22.
116. See id at 200, 930 P.2d at 321. Although recognizing only compelling state interests that
protect "public health, peace, and welfare" is similar to the state constitutional provision that allows
the government to limit religious activity that is "inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state,"
the court in First Covenant based its analysis on State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, which relied on
First Amendment interpretation. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203,
840 P.2d 174 (1992) (citing State ex rel. Holcomb v. Armstrong, 39 Wash. 2d 860, 864, 239 P.2d
545,548 (1952)).
117. See Munns, 131 Wash. 2d at 197, 930 P.2d at 320.
118. See id at 203, 930 P.2d at 323.
119. See id at 209-10, 930 P.2d at 326.
120. 140 Wash. 2d 143, 995 P.2d 33 (2000).
121. See 995 P.2d at 48.
122. See 995 P.2d at 40-43.
123. See 995 P.2d at 42.
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distinguished Munns, which had found a potential waiting period to be a
burden on free exercise.
[T]o the extent that the justiciability bar has been lowered in article
I, section 11 cases with regard to potential harm, it has been
lowered only in a fact-specific context-where an imposition is
placed upon a church's free exercise of religion entirely for cultural
or aesthetic (e.g., historical landmark designation), and not
compelling, reasons. 24
Without expressly saying so, the court implied that the county had a
compelling state interest in zoning as an exercise of the police power,
and that there was no less restrictive means of achieving the interest than
requiring Open Door to comply with the permitting process."
2. The Washington Court of Appeals Has Held That the Only
Compelling State Interests That Justify a Burden on Free Exercise
of Religion Are Interests in the Peace and Safety of the State
The Washington Court of Appeals has relied more specifically than
the Supreme Court of Washington on the text of the state constitution to
hold that government may infringe on free exercise rights only to
preserve the "peace and safety of the state." '26 In State v. Norman, 27 a
court of appeals panel held that parents' religious beliefs could not
justify their refusal to provide medical treatment to their children.' 2' The
court reasoned that the state's interest in the health of the state's children
qualifies as an interest within the "peace and safety of the state," as
required by the constitutional language.1 9 In State v. Balzer,3 ' a court of
appeals panel found that Article I, Section 11, did not protect the use and
possession of marijuana for religious purposes because the state's
interest in regulating drug possession and use is in the interest of the
124. 995 P.2d at 41-42.
125. 995 P.2d at 46-47.
126. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11; see State v. Key, No. 16415-2-111, 1999 WL 172663, at *3 (Wash.
Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999); State v. Balzer, 91 Wash. App. 44, 57-58, 954 P.2d 931, 937-38 (1998);
State v. Norman, 61 Wash. App. 16, 23, 808 P.2d 1159, 1163 (1991); State v. Clifford, 57 Wash.
App. 127, 132, 787 P.2d 571, 574 (1990).
127. 61 Wash. App. 16, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991).
128. See id. at 24, 808 P.2d at 1163.
129. See id. at 23, 808 P.2d at 1163.
130. 91 Wash. App. 44, 954 P.2d 931 (1998).
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"peace and safety of the state...' Most recently, in State v. Key,132 a
court of appeals panel held that the state could require a convicted felon
to provide a random urine sample, even if it meant that the individual had
to break a religious fast to do so. 3 The court found that the state's
compelling interest in monitoring the drug use of a convicted felon
constitutes an interest within the "peace and safety of the state" and
could be achieved only by requiring urine samples for drug testing on
demand."
D. Separation of Church and State Under Article I, Section 11: Public
Money or Property May Not Be Appropriatedfor Religious
Worship, Exercise, Instruction, or Establishments
The current test for separation of church and state under the
Washington Constitution asks first whether public money or property is
involved in the challenged action, and if so, whether that money is being
"appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment."'35 The
Supreme Court of Washington first announced this test in Washington
Health Care Facilities Authority v. Spellman,'36 where it upheld the use
of public bonds to provide financial assistance to the health-care facility
of a religions organization. 37 However, the two major recent separation-
of-church-and-state cases, Witters v. State of Washington Commission for
the Blind' and Maylon v. Pierce County,'39 illustrate an inconsistency in
applying the test. Witters ignored the Health Care Facilities test and
gave the separation-of-church-and-state language of the state constitution
a strict interpretation."4 In contrast, Maylon followed the structure of the
test and yet gave the constitution's establishment language a loose
interpretation. 4'
131. Ida at 56-65,954 P.2d at 937-41.
132. No. 16415-2-I1, 1999 WL 172663 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999).
133. See id. at *2.
134. Seei Uat*3.
135. Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Spellman, 96 Wash. 2d 68, 71, 633 P.2d 866,
867 (1981) (citing Wash. Const. art. I, § 11).
136. 96 Wash. 2d 68, 633 P.2d 866 (1981).
137. See id. at 72, 633 P.2d at 868.
138. 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989).
139. 131 Wash. 2d 779, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997).
140. See Witters, 112 Wash. 2d at 367-70, 771 P.2d at 1121-22.
141. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 799-803, 935 P.2d at 1282-84.
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1. Witters v. Washington State Commission for the Blind: Religious
Instruction
In Witters, the Supreme Court of Washington ultimately relied on the
Washington Constitution to prohibit public aid for religious education
even when the federal constitution permitted it. 42 The State of
Washington Commission for the Blind denied vocational rehabilitation
assistance 43 to Witters, a blind student, on the grounds that providing
assistance to study to become a pastor would violate the state
constitution's requirement of separation of church and state.'" When he
applied for assistance, Witters was enrolled at a Bible College where his
coursework focused on the Bible, ethics, speech, and church
administration.'45
The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed the decision of the
Commission denying the aid, but initially relied on the federal
constitution, finding that providing aid would have the primary effect of
advancing religion.'46 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and found that
because the money would not be paid directly to the college but to the
student who would then make a decision where to spend it, the aid did
not violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause.'47
On remand, the Supreme Court of Washington held that providing aid
to Witters under the program violated Article I, Section 11, of the
Washington Constitution because public money would be applied to
religious "instruction" as specifically prohibited by the constitutional
provision.4 ' The court concluded that the Washington State Constitution
"prohibits the taxpayers from being put in the position of paying for the
religious instruction of aspirants to the clergy with whose religious views
they may disagree."' 49
142. See Witters, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 771 P.2d 1119; see supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
143. See Wash. Rev. Code § 74.16.181 (1981) (providing that legally blind persons qualify to
receive vocational assistance, including education and training).
144. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,483-84 (1986).
145. See id. at483.
146. See Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 629, 689 P.2d 53,
55 (1984) rev'd sub nom. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,483-84
(1986).
147. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89.
148. Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 365, 771 P.2d 1119,
1120 (1989).
149. Id.
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In its reconsideration of the case under the state constitution, the court
relied on Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents,'"0
which defined "religious instruction' as that which "resembles worship"
and is "devotional in nature and designed to induce faith and belief in the
student."'' The Witters court found that Witters' religious instruction
was "designed to prepare him for a career promoting Christianity" and
necessarily involved the "indoctrination" of Christian beliefs.'52 The
Witters court concluded that Bible study and church courses were by
definition "devotional in nature and designed to induce faith and belief in
the student."' However, the dissent noted that the record lacked
evidence that Witters' course Work involved religious instruction of the
sort envisioned by Calvary."
After determining that aid to Witters would violate the state consti-
tution's establishment prohibition, the court asked whether the denial of
aid created tension between establishment and free exercise by
encroaching on Witters' rights to freely exercise his religion.' The court
reasoned that because Witters was not being pressured or forced to
violate any tenet of his religious beliefs, the denial did not violate his free
exercise rights. 6 The court also asked whether the denial of funds
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal constitution." 7 It concluded that the compelling state interest in
ensuring the stricter separation of church and state set forth in the
Washington Constitution justified the denial of aid and did not violate
equal protection.
58
150. 72 Wash. 2d 912, 436 P.2d 189 (1967) (holding University of Washington did not violate
state constitution by offering course in Biblical literature).
151. Id at 919, 436 P.2d at 194.
152. Witters, 112 Wash. 2d at 369-70, 771 P.2d at 1122.
153. ld at 369, 771 P.2d at 1122 (citing Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents,
72 Wash. 2d 912,919,436 P.2d 189, 194 (1967)).
154. See id at 378, 771 P.2d at 1126 (Utter, J., dissenting).
155. See ia at 370-71, 771 P.2d at 1122-23. The court addressed this question in terms of the
free exercise rights ensured by the federal Constitution rather than by the Washington Constitution.
See id. However, the tension between free exercise and establishment rights is present in the
Washington Constitution as well as the federal Constitution. See infra note 182 and accompanying
text.
156. See Witters, 112 Wash. 2d at 371-72, 771 P.2d at 1122-23.
157. See id. at 372-73, 771 P.2d at 1123-24.
158. Seeki
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2. Maylon v. Pierce County: Religious Exercise
In Maylon v. Pierce County,'5 9 the court held that a sheriff's
department volunteer chaplaincy program did not violate the Washington
separation-of-church-and-state provision because the money appropri-
ated to the program served secular purposes."6 The Pierce County
Sheriff's Department ran a volunteer chaplaincy program to aid and
counsel victims of crime, as well as law enforcement officers and their
families. 6 ' The program appropriated no funds to compensate the
volunteers,' but chaplains received insurance coverage, radios, and
office space for the coordination of their services. 6 Although the nature
of the chaplains' work was secular, the volunteers were pastors of local
congregations and occasionally their work as chaplains involved some
discussion of religious subjects." Maylon, a citizen and taxpayer in
Pierce County, brought suit alleging that the chaplaincy program violated
the separation-of-church-and-state requirements of both the state and
federal constitutions."
Applying the test of Washington Health Care Facilities Authority v.
Spellman,66 the court asked whether public money had been "appro-
priated for" or "applied to" one of the four religious purposes listed in
Article I, Section 11: "[R]eligious worship, exercise or instruction, or the
support of any religious establishment."' 67 The court concluded that the
chaplaincy program appropriated items, such as radios and insurance, for
a secular rather than a religious purpose. 68 The court also found that a
volunteer chaplain's religious exercise with a victim who initiates that
exercise did not violate the state constitution. 69 According to the court,
such expressions of personal convictions are not what the state
159. 131 Wash. 2d 779, 935 P.2d 1272 (1997).
160. See id. at 814, 935 P.2d at 1289. The court also found that the program did not violate the
establishment clause of the First Amendment. See id.
161. See id. at 787, 935 P.2d at 1275.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. For example, the chaplains at times were faced with a family member of a deceased person
who sought answers of a religious nature as to why the death had occurred. See id. at 789, 935 P.2d
at 1276.
165. See id. at 784, 935 P.2d at 1274.
166. 96 Wash. 2d 68, 71, 633 P.2d 866, 867 (1981).
167. Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 799-800, 935 P.2d at 1282.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 802-03, 935 P.2d at 1283-84.
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constitution was designed to guard against."' The court explained that
the state constitution does not remove volunteers' freedom to express
their religion simply because they are working in concert with the state to
achieve a secular objective.'
In reaching its decision, the court noted that Article I, Section 11,
must be examined in its entirety and in the context of its title, "Religious
Freedom."'72 Under this contextual approach, the court found that
because Article I, Section 11, assures that chaplaincy programs will not
be prohibited for state "institutions" or public hospitals, 73 the provision
could not be interpreted to prohibit a volunteer chaplain from engaging
in religious discussion with a crime victim or a law enforcement
officer." The court asserted that the state constitution's list of
exceptions could not be read to imply that all other chaplaincy programs
are to be specifically prohibited. 7 To the contrary, the court read the list
to imply that the specific exemptions demonstrate an intent to exempt
other chaplaincy programs from the requirements of Article I, Section
11.176 The court concluded that "Mr. Maylon has simply not been
compelled to furnish contributions of money to propagate opinions with
which he disagrees."' 77
The Supreme Court of Washington has held that Article I, Section 11,
of the Washington Constitution provides greater protection than the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution for both free exercise rights' and
establishment rights.'79 However, recent case law under Article I, Section
11, illustrates that despite the court's professed intentions to give the
state constitution independent analysis, the court has not consistently
done so. The current Article I, Section 11, free exercise jurisprudence is
nearly indistinguishable from the federal strict scrutiny test of Sherbert,
and has not been consistently applied."' Establishment jurisprudence
170. See id
171. See i. at 803, 935 P.2d at 1284.
172. See id. at 800, 935 P.2d at 1282.
173. See Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
174. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 800-01,935 P.2d at 1282-83.
175. See id
176. See id
177. Id. at 803, 935 P.2d at 1284.
178. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 226, 840 P.2d 174, 187
(1992).
179. See Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 368, 771 P.2d 1119,
1121 (1989).
180. See Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199-200,930 P.2d 318,321 (1997).
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under the Washington Constitution, while less dependent on federal
analysis, has inconsistently interpreted the text of Article I, Section 11,
and has not always applied or followed the court's articulated test.
III. WASHINGTON COURTS SHOULD EXTEND THEIR
APPLICATION OF THE GUNWALL FACTORS TO DEVELOP
A DISTINCT RELIGIOUS-LIBERTY JURISPRUDENCE
UNDER THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION
The Supreme Court of Washington, having determined under the
Gunwall criteria that Article I, Section 11, provides more protection for
free exercise and establishment rights than the federal constitution,1 81
needs to develop an analysis that accounts for that greater protection.
Because the language of the Washington provision is broader than that of
the First Amendment, the potential for tension between Washington free
exercise and establishment rights is magnified.12 The need for
Washington courts to develop a distinct analysis of Article I, Section 11,
that accounts for this tension is therefore all the more important. To
address this tension, Washington courts should develop a distinct
Washington religious-freedom analysis that relies primarily on the rich
text of Article I, Section 11.
Gunwall provides a set of criteria to guide the briefing of a court on
state constitutional issues.'83 Analysis under Gunwall leads to one of two
conclusions: either the state constitution provides more protection than
the federal constitution in a particular area and therefore requires a
separate analysis, or it does not.' 84 Although the Gunwall analysis does
not necessarily dictate the actual application of a state constitutional
provision, the court adopted the criteria in part to guide interpretation of
the state constitution."' Thus, a complete application of Article I, Section
11, should include the Gunwall considerations. However, Washington
181. See supra Part II.B.
182. But see Tarr, supra note 16, at 78 (arguing that because state constitutions are often more
specific in their treatment of religion, tension between free exercise and establishment principles is
less likely to arise than in federal context).
183. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-63, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (1986); see also Utter,
supra note 65, at 1161.
184. See Utter, supra note 65, at 1162.
185. Seeid. at 1161.
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courts have yet to fully integrate the Gunwall criteria into Washington
religious-liberty jurisprudence. 186
The Gunwall criteria can help frame a distinct Washington analysis
that considers not only the specifics of the constitutional text but also the
overarching goal of individual religious freedom common to both the
free exercise and establishment provisions. In evaluating Article I,
Section 11, the court should use Gunwall and look to the fundamental
differences between the state and federal constitutions, the history of the
state constitution, the structure of the state constitution, and most
importantly, the language in the text of the provision.187
A. Courts Should Adopt an Analysis Acknowledging That Article I,
Section 11, Is Fundamentally Different from the First Amendment
In its discussion of the second Gunwall factor's application to Article
I, Section 11, the Supreme Court of Washington has acknowledged that
the state constitutional provision on religious freedom is more specific
than its federal counterpart. 18 8 In the free exercise context, the state
provision protects not only the "free exercise of religion,"'19 but also
"freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and
worship."'90 Thus, as the court has noted, the language of the provision
protects both belief and conduct.' By contrast, although the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment protects both belief
and conduct,'92 the actual language in the federal Free Exercise Clause
does not address both belief and conduct. 93 Under the Washington
constitution, protection of religious belief is "absolute," and cannot be
compromised for any reason; however, protection for religious conduct
springing from belief is not absolute.' While the federal test allows
government action to limit free exercise when necessary to serve a
186. See, e.g., First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 224-28, 840 P.2d
174, 186-87 (1992).
187. These are Gunwall factors two, three, five, and one, respectively. See Gunwall, 106
Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
188. See Maylon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 793, 935 P.2d 1272, 1278-79 (1997); First
Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 224, 840 P.2d at 186.
189. U.S. Const. amend. L
190. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
191. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 224, 840 P.2d at 186.
192. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402-03 (1963).
193. See U. S. Const. amend. L
194. Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199-200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997).
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compelling state interest,'95 the Washington provision allows no
compromise of belief and allows limitations on conduct only when the
conduct is "licenticious" or "inconsistent with the peace and safety of the
state.'
196
In the context of establishment, the state constitution ensures the
separation of church and state by prohibiting the use of public money or
property for "religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
any religious establishment."' 97 In contrast, the language of the First
Amendment is much less specific and simply prohibits laws "respecting"
religion.' 98 In light of the fundamental differences between the
Washington Constitution and the federal constitution, Washington courts
should develop a distinct religious-liberty jurisprudence.
B. Courts Should Look to the History ofArticle I, Section 11, to
Develop a Distinct Religious-Freedom Jurisprudence
The history of Article I, Section 11, examined under the third Gunwall
factor ' shows that the framers intended the state provision to provide
different protections from those of the First Amendment.2" The framers
of the Washington Constitution drafted the document during a period of
great national debate over religion and education,2"' and the framers
specifically sought to insulate the state from sectarian influences in
education.20 2 By contrast, the framers of the First Amendment were
concerned with preventing the national government from meddling in
state religion." 3 The framers of the First Amendment intended that
religion remain in the domain of the states and that the federal
government not have the ability to regulate religious activity.2 4 The
framers of Article I, Section 11, had a distinctly different focus than the
framers of the Bill of Rights when they sought to secure religious liberty
195. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
196. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
197. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
198. U.S. Const. amend. I; see also Maylon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 793, 935 P.2d
1272, 1278-79(1997).
199. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (1986).
200. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 794, 935 P.2d at 1279.
201. See supra Part II.A.
202. See Utter & Larson, supra note 47, at 467-68.
203. See Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 794-95, 935 P.2d at 1279-80.
204. See id.
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in Washington. 5 Accordingly, Washington courts should develop a.
distinct religious liberty jurisprudence.
C. Courts Should Focus on the State Constitution's Structure, Which
Secures Religious Liberty in Terms of the Rights of Citizens Rather
Than the Limits on Lawmakers
The fifth Gunwall factor, which looks at the structure of the state
constitution,2 6 shows that Article I, Section 11, affirmatively creates
rights for citizens rather than creating rights indirectly by limiting
government power as the federal Bill of Rights does.2" 7 This structural
argument is supported by another provision of the state constitution,
Article I, Section 1, which indicates that the state constitution exists to
protect the rights of individuals: "All political power is inherent in the
people, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the
governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual
rights."20 8 While the federal constitution bars Congress and the states
from restricting free exercise,' the Washington provision generates an
absolute positive right for citizens. This affirmative statement of an
individual right is stronger than one created by the limitation of a power
of Congress.2"0
The establishment provision in Article I, Section 11, also is intended
to create individual rights. Although the establishment provision is
concerned with the separation of church and state, it nevertheless was
placed under the heading of "Religious Freedom." 211 In prohibiting the
application of '!public money or property"2 2 to religion, the provision
focuses on protecting the religious freedom of the individual by ensuring
that people are not forced to support the "religious worship, exercise or
instruction, or... any religious establishment" of a religion in which
they do not believe.2"3 The structure of the federal Establishment Clause,
205. See id. at 795, 935 P.2d at 1280.
206. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66-67, 720 P.2d 808, 815 (1986).
207. See First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 235, 840 P-2d
174, 192 (1992) (Utter, J., concurring).
208. Wash. Const. art. I, § 1.
209. See U.S. Const. amend. L
210. See First Covenant, 120 Wash. 2d at 235, 840 P.2d at 192.
211. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
212. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 11 (emphasis added).
213. State ex rel. Dearie v. Frazier, 102 Wash. 369, 370, 173 P. 35, 36 (1918) (quoting I Op.
Att'y Gen. 142).
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by contrast, focuses on prohibiting government actions "respecting"
religious establishment.1 4 The structure of the state constitution shows
that courts should center religious-liberty jurisprudence under Article I,
Section 11, on the rights of individuals.
D. Washington Courts Should Rely on the State Constitution 's Text
and Focus on the Goal of Individual Religious Freedom, Lessening
the Tension Between Free Exercise and Establishment
The first Gunwall factor provides the best tool for courts to use in
construing the requirements of religious liberty in Washington: the text
of Article I, Section I l." In the establishment cases, the courts already
have developed a framework for a textual analysis and now must strive
for consistency in applying that framework and interpreting the language
of the Washington Constitution. In the free exercise context, clear
reliance on the text of the Washington Constitution will eliminate
confusion with federal analysis. In addition, although the text of Article
I, Section 11, creates a tension between free exercise and separation of
church and state, examination of the text in light of the structure of the
Washington Constitution also provides a way to lessen that tension. By
focusing on the constitution's stated goal of individual religious freedom,
courts can reconcile the competing interests of free exercise and
separation of church and state.
1. Washington Courts Should Adhere to the Health Care Facilities
Test in Establishment Cases and Consistently Interpret the
Constitutional Text
Washington courts need to adhere to the language of the Washington
Constitution in establishment cases. The Health Care Facilities test
carefully follows the language of the state constitution and provides a
good framework for consistent adjudication of separation-of-church-and-
state challenges under Article I, Section I1 "216 Although establishment
cases under the Washington Constitution have followed an independent
analysis as required by Gunwall,2 17 courts have been inconsistent in their
214. U.S. Const. amend. I.
215. See State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 65, 720 P.2d 808, 814 (1986).
216. See Washington Health Care Facilities Auth. v. Spellman, 96 Wash. 2d 68, 71, 633 P.2d 866,
867 (1981).
217. See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 60-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
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application of the Health Care Facilities test.218 Where Washington cases
have provided guidance in interpreting the actual language of Article I,
Section 11, Washington courts should carefully adhere to that precedent,
as the fourth Gunwall factor indicates.219 In accordance with the Health
Care Facilities test, inquiry should focus on whether public money or
property is appropriated or applied to religious worship, exercise, or
instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.Y0
2. Washington Courts Should Modify the Existing Test for Free
Exercise to Rely on the Text ofArticle I, Section 11, Rather Than on
First Amendment Analysis
Washington courts should abandon their complete reliance on the First
Amendment when deciding cases under the free exercise language of
Article I, Section 11, and should change the test to reflect the language of
the Washington Constitution. The current test for free exercise, which
allows government to restrict religious conduct when necessary to serve
a compelling state interest, is derived not from the language of the text of
Article I, Section 11, but from federal case law unrelated to the
Washington Constitution." According to the state constitution's text, the
only limit on "absolute" freedom of belief is for religious conduct that is
"licentiousf_"or "inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state."
Washington courts should deliberately depart from the federal strict
scrutiny terminology. Nowhere does Article I, Section 11, use the term
"compelling state interest." Even if courts were to limit compelling state
interests to those concerning the "peace and safety of the state," use of
federal terminology risks confusion with the very distinct First
Amendment provision.
Washington courts should develop a free exercise jurisprudence under
Article I, Section 11, that reflects the text of the provision itself. To start
with, Washington courts should adopt an analysis that more resembles
the one employed by the courts of appeals in State v. Norman,' State v.
218. Seesupra notes 138-41 and accompanying text
219. The fourth Gunwall factor looks to "preexisting state law." See Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at
66,720 P.2d at 815.
220. See Health Care Facilities, 96 Wash. 2d at 71, 633 P.2d at 867.
221. See supra Part ILC.1.
222. Wash. Coanst. art. , § 11.
223. 61 Wash. App. 16, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991).
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Balzer, 24 and State v. Key,225 which relies on the constitutional text to
prohibit government action restricting religious conduct only when the
conduct compromises the "peace and safety of the state."226 Under the
current test for free exercise, the complaining party first must show that
the government action has had a coercive effect on his or her free
exercise of religion.227 Courts should clarify what constitutes a coercive
effect on free exercise of religion by using the text to ask whether an
individual has been "denied absolute freedom of conscience in all
matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship" or is being "molested
or disturbed on account of religion. '22' The second step of the current test
for free exercise asks whether the government regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest. Courts should modify this step of the
test by relying on the state constitution to ask whether the exercise of the
religion in question is "licentious[]" or "inconsistent with the peace and
safety of the state."" Put differently, courts should ask whether the
religious activity endangers the community or individuals. If not, courts
should invalidate the government action.
Applied to Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, these
proposed modifications of the current free exercise test under Article I,
Section 11, would have dictated a different result. In Open Door, the
court found that requiring the church to submit to a permitting process
for a conditional use of its property placed only an incidental burden on
the church.230 However, under the language of the state constitution, the
church was being denied "[a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters
of religious. . . worship,"23' because its freedom to use its property to
provide church services was being threatened. In addition, the church
was being "molested or disturbed in... property on account of
religion," '232 because its use of its property for religious purposes could be
limited by the hearings examiner. According to Article I, Section 11, the
imposition of such a burden can be justified only by an interest in
224. 91 Wash. App. 44, 954 P.2d 931 (1998).
225. No. 16415-2-I1, 1999 WL 172663 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1999).
226. See supra Part II.C.2.
227. See Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 199, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997) (citing First United
Methodist Church v. Hearings Exam'r for the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Bd., 129 Wash. 2d
238, 246, 916 P.2d 347, 379 (1996)).
228. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
229. Wash. Const. art. I, § I I.
230. See Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wash. 2d 143, 995 P.2d 33, 46 (2000).
231. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
232. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
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preventing "acts of licentiousness" or protecting "the peace and safety of
the state." 3  As the dissent in Open Door pointed out, the county's
zoning power, which was its justification for the permit requirement,
cannot justify such a burden on religion, as it does not address acts of
licentiousness or threats to the peace and safety of the state. 4 Thus,
under the proposed test, the county could not require the church to
submit to the permitting process.
3. The Tension in the Washington Constitution Between Free Exercise
and Establishment Can Be Reduced by Focusing on the Goal of
Individual Religious Freedom
To minimize the tension between free exercise and separation of
church and state in Article I, Section 11, Washington courts must not
construe the constitutional text pertaining to one religious freedom in a
way that infringes on the other. In the past decade, the Supreme Court of
Washington has been developing its free exercise and establishment
analyses in isolation from one another and has yet to arrive at a synthesis
of the two principles."5 The solution to the tension between free exercise
and separation of church and state can be found in the text of Article I,
Section 11: the common goal of individual religious freedom.
While it might seem obvious that the goal of both the federal and state
religion provisions is to protect religious freedom, the framers of the
state constitution deliberately provided the title "Religious Freedom"
where the federal framers had not.26 Article I, Section 11, when
compared with the First Amendment, is more appropriately titled
"Religious Freedom" because the framers structurally designed it to
create affirmative individual rights rather than to prohibit government
action.2z
When presented with a challenge that falls under Article I, Section
11 -either free exercise or establishment-courts must be mindful of the
goal of individual religious freedom. Washington courts must look at
religious liberty as an individual right, as specifically stated in Article I,
233. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
234. See Open Door, 995 P.2d at 60 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
235. But see Maylon v. Pierce County, 131 Wash. 2d 779, 802-03, 935 P.2d 1272, 1283-84
(1997) (discussing free exercise).
236. Wash. Const. art. 1, § 11; see also Maylon, 131 Wash. 2d at 800, 935 P.2d at 1282.
237. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
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Section 1, rather than as a public right.238 Courts should strive for the
course that best protects the religious liberty of the individual without
hindering the religious liberty of others. To preserve the common goal of
religious freedom, every case that comes before a Washington court,
whether a free exercise case or an establishment case, should be
examined under the entirety of Article I, Section 11, to ensure that the
state walks the fine line between neither promoting nor hampering
individual religious beliefs and activities. If a court determines that state
action violates the separation-of-church-and-state protections of Article I,
Section 11, it should then check that result against the free exercise
requirements of the same provision and vice versa. If a court detects a
conflict between free exercise and separation of church and state, it
should resolve the case by asking which result best serves the religious
freedom of individuals.
In Witters v. State of Washington Commission for the Blind, 9 the
court passed up an excellent opportunity to synthesize free exercise and
establishment through a focus on the religious freedom of the
individual.2' Although the court directly addressed the question of
whether the denial of aid infringed on Witters' free exercise of his
religion,24' it found that the denial of assistance did not burden Witters'
ability to freely exercise his religion because becoming a minister was a
career choice rather than a religious choice.242 However, Witters' choice
was arguably religiously motivated and within the protection of free
243exercise. Witters chose to carry out his religious beliefs by becoming a
minister or church leader, and his free exercise of religion was
jeopardized when the state denied him that opportunity.2' If the denial of
Witters' financial assistance burdened his free exercise of religion, under
the current Article I, Section 11, test, the state would be required to show
a compelling state interest for the denial of aid.245 The only conceivable
interest the state could have in denying the assistance is the increased
238. See supra notes 208-13 and accompanying text.
239. 112 Wash. 2d363, 771 P.2d 1119 (1989).
240. Although the examples discussed here are establishment cases, the focus on the religious
freedom of the individual applies to all Article I, Section 11, cases.
241. See Witters, 112 Wash. 2d at 367, 370, 771 P.2d at 1121-22 (1989).
242. See id. at 372, 771 P.2d at 1123 (citing Witters v. State of Wash. Comm'n for the Blind, 102
Wash. 2d 624, 631, 689 P.2d 53, 56 (1984)).
243. See id. at 392-93, 771 P.2d at 1133 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
244. See id.
245. See Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 200, 930 P.2d 318, 321 (1997).
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separation of church and state.2' However, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held that a state interest in providing greater separation of church and
state is not sufficient to override free exercise rights.247 Under the
proposed textual approach to free exercise, a stricter separation of church
and state is not an interest in the "peace and safety of the state" and could
not be used to justify burdening free exercise rights.24 A focus on
individual religious freedom suggests that the court should not have
denied Witters' financial aid. While the denial of aid infringed on
Witters' individual religious freedom by preventing him from becoming
a pastor and carrying out his religious beliefs, the granting of aid would
not have infringed on individual religious freedom, because taxpayers
would not have been forced to support a religion they do not-believe in.
Maylon v. Pierce County,249 which upheld the sheriff's chaplaincy
program, also provided fertile ground for a synthesis between free
exercise and separation of church and state. The court briefly examined
the free exercise implications if the chaplains were not permitted to
express their religious beliefs to those who sought such information, but
did not rest its decision on those grounds." Although it would be
inappropriate for the chaplains, many of whom were community church
leaders, to evangelize actively in their volunteer capacity, the state
infringes on free exercise when it prevents two consenting individuals
from practicing their religion solely because the state brought them
together. The court could have rested its decision on the fact that the free
exercise rights of the volunteer chaplains would be burdened by
requiring the chaplains to refrain from religious discussion. A balancing
approach, based on the goal of individual religious freedom, would find
the chaplaincy program constitutional. By allowing the chaplaincy
program, the court preserved the individual religious freedom of the
chaplains without infringing on the individual religious freedom of the
taxpayers.
246. See Witters, 112 Wash. 2d at 394, 771 P.2d at 1134 (Dolliver, J., dissenting). The court
recognized this as a compelling state interest for equal protection purposes. See id. at 372-73, 771
P.2d at 1123-24.
247. See E at 394-95, 771 P.2d at 1134-35 (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (citing Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 275-76 (1981)).
248. See ia at 395, 771 P.2d at 1135 (Dolliver, J., dissenting).
249. 131 Wash. 2d 779,935 P.2d 1272 (1997).
250. See Ed at 802-03, 935 P.2d at 1283-84.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In January 2000, college student Joshua Davey filed suit in federal
district court alleging, among other things, that the Washington governor
and other state officials violated his free exercise rights under the
Washington Constitution when they excluded students majoring in
theology from eligibility for the Washington Promise Scholarship.25'
Davey had already secured a Promise Scholarship and was majoring in
theology at Northwest College in Kirkland when he learned that because
of the state's new policy he was no longer eligible to receive the
scholarship. 2 Though the case is in federal court, it provides an
excellent opportunity for reconsideration of the Witters decision. The
case is factually similar to Witters, and presents both free exercise and
establishment issues that could be resolved through a focus on individual
religious freedom.
As the Supreme Court of Washington has repeatedly recognized, the state
constitution protects religious liberty differently than the federal constitution.
Accordingly, religious-freedom jurisprudence in Washington should
account for that difference. The Gunwall factors provide guidance in
developing a jurisprudence that reflects the intricacies of Article I,
Section 11. The differences between the state and federal religion
provisions, the history of Article I, Section 11, and the structure of the
Washington Constitution all point to a textually based religious-liberty
jurisprudence in Washington. The textual analysis provided by the
Health Care Facilities test for establishment cases should be emulated in
the free exercise context. Courts should modify the existing free exercise
test by replacing federal strict scrutiny terminology with the language of
the state constitution. In addition, courts should strive to resolve the
tension between free exercise and separation of church and state that is
present in the text by focusing on the goal of individual religious
freedom.
251. See Davey v. Locke, No. COO-0061R, at 10-I I (W.D. Wash. filed Jan. 13, 2000).
252. See id. at 4-5.
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